BrigGen Grzegorz Potrzuski, Head of the Planning and Programming Directorate for the Development of the Armed Forces (P5) at the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, talks to Marcin Ogdowski and Tadeusz Wróbel about the Model 44 pilot program, the future structure of combat battalions in the Polish Armed Forces, and the growing role of unmanned systems.

New organizational structures are being tested in selected battalions of the 12th Mechanized Brigade and the 17th Greater Poland Mechanized Brigade. What prompted the need for the changes known as Model 44?

The need to introduce Model 44 stems from the experience of contemporary armed conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, as well as the analyses of changes occurring on the battlefield. The tests, which have been underway for a year, were preceded by years of analysis and simulations conducted, among others, by the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and subordinate commands and centers. They proved that the current structure and equipment limit the battalions’ ability to operate effectively and for extended periods. Model 44 is intended to strengthen their reconnaissance and strike capabilities, improve command and control, and increase flexibility, interoperability, and the ability to conduct multidomain operations.

How is this to be achieved?

A key element of the Model 44 program is saturating the battalion with unmanned systems – from reconnaissance and strike drones, through loitering munitions and first-person view (FPV) drones, to ground platforms intended, among other things, for delivering supplies and evacuating the wounded. This required restructuring the battalion: one of the four combat companies was replaced by an unmanned weapons systems company. As a result, the number of combat vehicles was reduced from 58 to 44 – hence the name Model 44.

Why adopt a solution that some might regard as weakening the battalion?

We also analyzed assigning unmanned systems to combat companies and adding a new company to the existing structure. However, these solutions would have made the battalion excessively large, complicating command and control and reducing its maneuverability.
Model 44 maintains a similar personnel strength while increasing combat potential through the synergy of manned and unmanned systems. Fourteen vehicles will be replaced by hundreds of unmanned systems, including loitering munitions capable of precisely engaging targets at ranges of up to 30 km. This will provide the battalion commander with a capability of independently engaging targets at distances previously unattainable at this level.

Will the commander be also able to see at much longer distances than before?

Exactly. Reconnaissance drones will allow the battalion commander to monitor the situation at distances of several dozen kilometers, and receive an almost real-time picture of the battlefield. This will enable earlier detection of the enemy, tracking of their activities, and rapid designation of targets for fires. Reducing the time between target detection and engagement will increase the battalion’s precision and operational tempo.
Until now, the battalion only had a reconnaissance platoon with incomparably more limitations. To obtain information about the enemy, soldiers often had to go on dangerous missions deep into enemy positions.
Model 44 changes this. Reconnaissance tasks will be taken over by unmanned systems, which – in addition to the above-mentioned advantages – also means that we will no longer expose scouts to the risk of detection and destruction.

Will artificial intelligence take over some of these tasks?

That is yet another assumption behind Model 44. Artificial intelligence algorithms are intended to support the command-and-control process, particularly in analyzing the large volumes of reconnaissance data collected by unmanned systems. Their role will be to perform preliminary analysis, selection, and prioritization of information, including detecting and classifying targets and identifying threats. It should be clearly emphasized, however, that artificial intelligence will not replace the commander. It will be a tool that enhances the commander’s situational awareness, supports him in decision-making, and allow for effective use of available combat capabilities.

The initial concept envisaged an anti-drone team within the unmanned weapons systems company [UWSC]. Is that sufficient given the growing threat posed by unmanned systems?

One of the conclusions from the Model 44 tests so far is the need to further strengthen the battalion’s ability to counter unmanned systems. The preliminary concept envisages establishing a specialized anti-drone team within the UWSC, but protection cannot be limited to a single subunit. Therefore, all battalion combat vehicles are to be equipped with systems for detecting and jamming enemy drones. Counter-UAS capabilities should become an integral part of the entire battalion, creating a layered protection system covering all subunits.

Will jamming alone be enough? Fiber-optic-controlled drones are resistant to it.

That is why, in addition to electronic warfare systems, physical vehicle protection measures such as protective nets are planned. We are also considering equipping battalions with kinetic counter-drone systems, including elements of the emerging San anti-drone system, such as multi-barrel machine guns. Combining electronic warfare, passive protection, and kinetic effectors is intended to provide effective defense against a variety of threats posed by unmanned systems.

Let’s go back to drones. Will they be found only in unmanned weapons systems companies?

No. Various unmanned systems, tailored to the needs of individual elements of the combat formation, will also be deployed in other subunits. The company commander will receive reconnaissance and target-engagement assets capable of operating at ranges of up to several dozen kilometers, while the battalion commander will have systems with ranges of several dozen kilometers. The flow of information will also change. Under Model 44, the battalion will become not only a recipient of data from brigade level but also an important source of information. Through the battle management system [BMS], it will feed information to higher-level commands, thereby increasing their situational awareness.

Since we’re talking about the brigade level: will unmanned systems units also be established at that level in the future?

Yes, there are plans for such a battalion. However, for now I cannot say anything more about it.

How will the mass use of drones in combat operations change military training?

The mass use of unmanned systems will force fundamental changes in the training of troops and commands at all levels. Drones will become an integral element of planning, conducting, and supporting operations. Training will cover the interaction of manned and unmanned systems, the use of real-time reconnaissance data, and operations in a multidomain environment. Equally important will be the interoperability of systems and procedures, enabling our subunits to operate effectively as part of allied formations.
The experience of the war in Ukraine shows that on a battlefield saturated with drones, subunits operate in dispersed formations, which increases the importance of squad and platoon commanders. We must place greater emphasis on their independence and speed of decision-making. Computer-based exercises have confirmed that we need well-trained commanders who are tactically astute.

Every soldier, in addition to being highly proficient with their standard-issue weapon, should be able to operate drones and function in an environment where they are common. At least some operators should also receive combat-engineer training. This means gradually moving towards a situation where a soldier is trained in at least two specialties.
Training centers will also need to change. We will need facilities that prepare drone operators, particularly during the initial period, when training requirements will be greatest and the number of instructors limited. Work in this area is already underway.

Let’s go back to the Model 44 pilot program. The companies participating in it have handed in their Rosomaks. In their place – apart from drones – came Ford Ranger vehicles and heavier M-ATVs, the latter for the reconnaissance platoon. During subsequent exercises, however, it turned out that the Rangers do not work everywhere.

The tests showed that although the Ford Ranger is reliable for many tasks, its transport capacity is insufficient for the strike platoon equipped with FlyEye and Warmate systems. In addition to unmanned systems and loitering munitions, this subunit also carries control stations, generators, compressors, and other equipment. Therefore, we are considering using a larger platform, such as a van-type delivery vehicle. This is possible because the platoon operates in the battalion’s rear area. In its case, payload capacity, mobility, and the ability to rapidly deploy its operating position are more important than a high level of ballistic protection.

The pilot units from the 12th and 17th Mechanized Brigades are to be certified in November 2026. What happens next?

In June, we conducted an initial assessment of the project and decided to continue it. Model 44 has been incorporated into The Polish Armed Forces Development Program for 2025–2039 as the target, standardized structure for combat battalions.
Although the pilot program is still ongoing, we have already begun analyzing the sequence in which the new structure should be introduced in tank and mechanized battalions. The experience so far confirms the validity of the solutions adopted, while questions coming from other units about when they will be reorganized demonstrate that this is a direction of development expected by the land forces. Once the pilot program in motorized battalions is completed and its lessons implemented, subsequent battalions will be reorganized in accordance with the final structure developed.

How long will this restructuring process take?

The size of our land forces, which are ultimately expected to comprise several dozen combat brigades, means that the restructuring of battalions must be spread over several years. It must be coordinated with deliveries of new weapons and equipment, while also maintaining combat readiness and taking into account the ministry’s financial capabilities.

The structure of the armed forces is a set of interconnected elements, and a change in one area usually necessitates modifications in others. What changes will be triggered by the restructuring of combat battalions?

It is still too early to draw final conclusions, but the growing number of electronic systems and electrically powered drones will certainly increase demand for energy. Providing it in field conditions will be a challenge for military logistics and will require more power generators, energy-storage systems, battery sets, and transport platforms. On the other hand, reducing the number of combat vehicles in a battalion will decrease the demand for ammunition and other supplies previously intended for the motorized company. A full assessment will only be possible once the pilot program is completed and final conclusions have been formulated.

Mental changes will also be necessary, because not all military personnel will readily adapt to unmanned technologies.

Younger personnel, who use modern technologies on a daily basis, will find it easier to adapt to operating in a digital battlefield environment. However, the ability to operate unmanned systems is becoming essential for most soldiers. It is therefore necessary to systematically develop the capabilities of entire subunits in the use of drones, electronic warfare, and multidomain operations.

We may have a problem with the mass production of small FPV drones. The military does not place large orders because it does not want to stock equipment that will be obsolete in a few years, while companies do not want to expand production capacity without guaranteed orders. How can these two conflicting positions be reconciled? Could drone laboratories be used for such production?

From the perspective of the Polish Armed Forces, the most effective approach would be cooperation with several suppliers that would continuously modernize their products. This would provide flexibility in procurement, competition, and an appropriate pace of innovation.
This model will be complemented by drone laboratories initiated by the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, which are already operating in selected units. The drone labs carry out repairs of unmanned systems and manufacture certain parts using 3D printing. We assume that in the future, brigade-level laboratories will be capable of designing, producing, and modernizing drones using components supplied by industry. This will increase the armed forces’ self-sufficiency and enable them to respond more quickly to changing battlefield requirements.

What will the changes to battalion structures look like from a financial perspective? Do existing contracts for weapons systems need to be amended?

The task of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces is to build capabilities while taking into account the budget of the Ministry of National Defense. Preliminary analyses indicate that the costs and benefits of the restructuring should balance out. Funds saved on maintaining and supplying the existing fourth company, including its ammunition, will be allocated to unmanned systems. At the same time, the 14 “freed-up” combat vehicles or tanks will make it possible to equip a company in another battalion. Across several dozen battalions, this means hundreds of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers that can be used more efficiently or placed in equipment reserves. The implementation of Model 44 will not require the cancellation of any existing contracts for the delivery of combat vehicles or tanks.

That does not change the fact that Model 44 represents a departure from viewing a battalion’s strength solely through the prism of armor.

Because there is no other way. Today, it is not the side with more steel and armor that wins, but the one that sees, understands, and reacts faster by using modern technologies. Model 44 represents a fundamental change in how we perceive a battalion’s potential. Its value will be determined not only by the number of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, but also by its ability to rapidly acquire and analyze information and use it in combat. Put most simply, we are reducing armor in favor of silicon-based technology.

BrigGen Grzegorz Potrzuski
He is Head of the Planning and Programming Directorate for the Development of the Armed Forces (P5) at the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. Previously, he served as Head of the Rocket and Artillery Forces Directorate at the Land Forces Inspectorate of the General Command of the Branches of the Armed Forces.