Tensions are growing in the Baltic Sea. After a series of incidents that damaged underwater power cables, NATO has launched Operation Baltic Sentry. The battle that the Alliance is fighting is a little like a fight against a shadow, though it can be won.

Fot. Rajavartiolaitos

“Certain forces are trying to destabilize our societies. Some of these activities are aimed at destroying undersea infrastructure. There are reasons for concern because its safety is of primary importance to us,” Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO, emphasized during his visit to Helsinki in January. Moments later, he announced the start of Operation Baltic Sentry, with the participation of frigates, submarines, drones and aviation.

The Alliance decided to do what Poland appealed for in November 2024: increase the control over key shipping routes and ensure underwater installations, on which the economic condition of the eastern flank countries largely depends. Experts have no doubt: that this is a terribly difficult task. Although from a strategic point of view the Alliance rules in the Baltic Sea, the battle it has to fight resembles a fight against the shadow.

In the Footsteps of the Tsar

November, 2024. The Chinese bulk carrier, Yi Peng 3, going across the Baltic Sea throws an anchor and drags it along the seabed for several dozen kilometers. On the way, the carrier cuts two fiber-optic cables. The first connects Sweden with Lithuania, and the second Finland with Germany. The vessel is then detained by the Danish Navy and is anchored in the Kattegat Strait for several weeks. The Chinese let a representative of the Swedish commission for the investigation of accidents at sea, but not the prosecutor investigating the alleged sabotage. Eventually, the ship sails off to Egypt.

The end of December 2024. The Eagle S tanker, sailing under the Cook Islands flag, breaches the Estlink 2 power cable connecting Finland and Estonia. The operating mode is the same as in the case of Yi Peng 3 – an anchor dragged along the seabed. The Finnish Coast Guard stops the vessel before she reaches the Estlink 1 cable and the Balticconnector gas pipeline. Still, on this ill-fated day, operators from Finland, Germany, and Estonia report damage to several Baltic data transmission wires.

Finally, the first half of January 2025. The German services are put on their feet because of the Eventin tanker, which sails under the flag of Panama. The ship, filled to the brim with crude oil, drifts in the vicinity of Rügen. Germany manages to take control of it and use tugboats to push it beyond the Baltic Sea.

Fot. Rajavartiolaitos

In January, investigators from several countries were still inspecting the details of these incidents. The traces led to Russia. All the vessels were sailing from there or heading there. The first vessel has a Russian captain, and the other two most likely belong to the so-called shadow fleet. This name includes a group of tankers registered in the Pacific, African, or Latin American countries, which, however, remain in the service of the Kremlin. They export oil from Russia, bypassing sanctions.

“It is hard to have any doubts right now. The Russians are waging a hybrid war against the West in the Baltic Sea. This is a special action aimed at the enemy’s critical infrastructure. Experts call it a war for the seabed,” emphasizes Andrzej Makowski, Prof., an academic at the Polish Naval Academy (AMW) and a retired officer. Similar incidents have occurred before. It is enough to mention the events in the Autumn of 2023, when a vessel under the flag of Hong Kong breached the Balticconnector gas pipeline, damaging the telecom cable running along it. Presently, however, the situation has escalated. Why? “At this point, we can only speak hypothetically,” admits Krzysztof Kubiak, Prof., a political scientist at the Jan Kochanowski University (UJK) in Kielce and the Polish Navy officer in reserve. “It is possible that Russia, exhausted by the war, is searching for new ways to gain an advantage over its opponent. The attacks in the Baltic Sea are supposed to distract NATO’s attention. NATO states, especially Europeans, will now guard their critical infrastructure, and they will invest time and money to do it. According to the Kremlin’s calculation, as a result, their interest in Ukraine may weaken,” adds the expert.

That’s not all. In a hybrid war, the Kremlin probably seeks to intimidate Western European societies, but it also takes revenge for locking a majority of local markets for Russian raw materials. This process has been going on since the beginning of a full-scale war, and on January 1, 2025, the Russians got another serious blow. According to previous announcements, Ukraine stopped the transit of gas and oil, which have so far flowed from the east through its territory. For Gazprom, this means a loss of billions of dollars. Europe already obtains a significant part of its raw materials from alternative sources. In this context, the Baltic Sea and the infrastructure located on it are crucial.

Andrzej Makowski, Prof., indicates that the effects of recent incidents in the Baltic Sea have largely affected Sweden and Finland. “This can be read as a message from the Kremlin: you have decided to join NATO, so now you are bearing the consequences of it,” the expert believes. Krzysztof Kubiak, Prof., adds: “Strategically, the expansion of the Alliance with two Nordic countries is a huge defeat for Putin. In the Baltic Sea basin, Russia has gone back to the time of Tsar Peter I. The Russians don’t have many assets, so they will do everything to balance this disparity.” The question is, though, what the West can do in such a situation.

Sea Knot

“In the purely technical aspect, it is of course possible to monitor all cables or pipelines with surveillance systems. In reality, however, no one will do that. It would be too costly,” says Andrzej Makowski, Prof. Therefore, patrolling sensitive water basins is better. “Ships move along fixed shipping routes. In addition, according to the law, they are required to use the automatic identification system (AIS). Drifting off course or turning the AIS off is enough to signal that such a vessel should be closer monitored,” emphasizes the expert. At the same time, it can be assumed that the mere presence of NATO ships will deter potential saboteurs. Still, what if it won’t? Experts admit that stopping the vessel, let alone boarding it, is not simple.

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the sea is divided into several areas. Territorial waters extend up to 12 miles from the shore. “The regulations of the coastal state are binding here,” explains Krzysztof Kubiak, Prof. Further on, we still have an exclusive economic zone and international waters, although those do not occur in the Baltic Sea, as it is too small. However, even in the exclusive economic zone, the jurisdiction of a given country is limited. There is freedom of navigation. On such waters, a vessel can be stopped and inspected only in exceptional circumstances – when suspected of piracy or smuggling of weapons or drugs. “I think that an attempt to sabotage critical infrastructure can also be placed on this list, but this is exactly what the convention does not specify,” says the expert.

Fot. Havariekommando

Either way, evidence must be strong to take such an action. This means catching the crew almost red-handed. Except that it is quite a challenge in vast sea areas. The matter is further confused by ownership issues. Tankers or general cargo vessels are often registered in countries where the costs of such procedures are low. As if that wasn’t enough, their owners frequently reside on the other side of the world. “It is easy to imagine a ship sailing under the Kiribati flag, owned by a company based in Mongolia, which is owned by a capital group from the Marshall Islands. We have many such cases,” admits the expert. Example? The already mentioned Eagle S. After the tanker was detained, the owner from the United Arab Emirates showed up and accused Finland of... kidnapping the vessel. Navigating through a maze of regulations and documents certainly can provide a cover for various Russian entities.

Experts agree – it is impossible to solve this legal knot. It is enough to look at the convention on the law of the sea. “This is a UN document, so clarifying its provisions would require the consent of many countries with often conflicting interests,” says Krzysztof Kubiak. However, this does not mean that NATO is helpless. “Finland here is the example, as in the case of Eagle S, they did not play games. They acted ruthlessly, quickly, and effectively, they showed determination,” the expert says. “As history shows, only this way of acting appeals to Russia...,” he adds. Making it difficult for the crews affects ship owners. Downtimes and stoppage hit their pockets, and they got discouraged about the cooperation with Russia. At the same time, Russia risks exposure and international repercussions. For instance, in the form of further sanctions.

How Far Will Russia Go?

Meanwhile, acts of sabotage have so far had one fundamental feature – they were carried out with simple, not to say crude, methods. “The anchor dragged on the seabed is not a very sophisticated weapon, but what counts here is effectiveness. The enemy achieved the intended effect, what’s more, at a relatively low cost,” believes a soldier of Formoza Military Unit (JWF), a Polish naval commando unit that operates primarily in the Baltic Sea. What else will Russia go about? “The number of combinations here is practically unlimited,” admits our interlocutor. “The adversary can provoke a collision of ships and thus block the approach to one of the ports. They can attack the port by planting containers with dangerous substances thus causing a biological threat. They may finally damage one of the Baltic wrecks, for instance, the Franken tanker resting at the bottom of the Gulf of Gdansk. There are still tons of fuel oil in its tanks. The release of this cargo would lead to an ecological disaster, and it would be treacherous because sea currents would most likely transfer pollution towards the Königsberg region,” he adds. A similar threat, although in a slightly different context, is pointed out by Andrzej Makowski, Prof. “Unfortunately, a catastrophic scenario in the Baltic Sea can also come out by itself. Many ships belonging to the ‘shadow fleet’ are old vessels, with questionable technical condition, and thus susceptible to various types of accidents. Their mere going out to sea carries a risk,” he emphasizes.

Meanwhile, not only transport vessels can be used for diversion activities. The Russians involve the entire state apparatus in destabilization operations. This is dealt with by services, but also by the media or scientific institutions. Their competences are often difficult to separate. Such is the case with the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI). The institution sends research ships to the seas and oceans, which can be used to collect sensitive data and underwater diversion.

Fot. Rajavartiolaitos

Russia is acting in partial shadow, often using non-obvious ways and resources, possibly with the support of China, as the origin of some of the ships involved in recent incidents would indicate. It will probably stay that way. “I don’t think the Navy is directly involved in sabotage activities in the Baltic Sea. In the event of a foul-up, the traces would lead to the Kremlin, and this is what the Russians probably want to avoid. They will rather reach for proxy tools,” says the Formoza soldier.

Strengthening the Navy

So far, the maritime diversion has not directly affected Poland, but as our interlocutor emphasizes, such attempts will certainly occur. To minimize the risk, the Polish Navy has been conducting Operation Zatoka (Operation Bay) for some time now. Designated ships of both flotillas regularly patrol Polish territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. “We have recently increased the intensity of these activities. So far, however, we have not recorded any alarming signals on our waters,” admits ViceAdm Krzysztof Jaworski, who heads the Maritime Operations Center – Naval Component Command (COM-DKM) in Gdynia.

The Baltic Sea is of particular importance to Poland. Most of the gas used by Poland is delivered by sea. The fuel flows from Norway through the Baltic Pipe, it is also transported in the cargo holds of gas carriers arriving at the gas terminal in Świnoujście. The power energy infrastructure in the Baltic region is also still being expanded. Soon, for example, offshore wind farms will be built at the level of the Polish coast.

Meanwhile, according to experts, the Polish Navy also requires serious investments. The shipyards are already building the first of three Miecznik-class missile frigates, two reconnaissance ships, and three mine destroyers. In the near future the keel will be laid for a modern rescue ship. In the coming months, the Polish Ministry of Defense is to sign a contract for the acquisition of new submarines. The investments should significantly strengthen the naval forces. However, as ViceAdm Krzysztof Jaworski emphasizes, even today the Navy has a lot of assets. “In Operation Zatoka we use, among others, the frigates Oliver Hazard Perry and the ORP Ślązak ship, which can operate for a long time outside the home port. The abilities possessed by Kormoran II mine destroyers are also useful. Autonomous underwater vehicles and sonars, which are part of their equipment, allow for accurate seabed monitoring, including inspecting underwater pipelines and cables,” lists the commander of COM-DKM. As he admits, Poland will certainly join Operation Baltic Sentry as well.

In the meantime, the operation does not come down to sending additional ships to the Baltic Sea. NATO also seeks to strengthen cooperation between the operational commands of individual countries. It is about the quick exchange of information. As a means to better coordinate activities in the Baltic Sea, last autumn a new command was established, which will be rotated by officers from member states (more on this subject in Polska Zbrojna of December 2024). The command is now located in Rostock, but in a few years, it will be moved to Gdynia. Finally, NATO has the Maritime Center for the Security of Underwater Critical Infrastructure, which coordinates all related activities. All this leads to one conclusion – when it comes to the Baltic Sea, one has to be prepared for a long and difficult battle.
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Translated by Anita Kwaterowska